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The biggest map on the wall, and the narrowest door in. Four structural gaps the majors can't serve. We hold the keys to all four.
Scroll, or press J/K to walk the cues
The category clears the bar.
The bridge is conditional.
The majors — Live Nation, AEG, CTS Eventim, KKR/CVC-backed Superstruct — already consolidated the obvious assets at ~11x EBITDA. Our playable market is not "live entertainment." It is four structural gaps the majors can't or won't serve: estate live-IP carve-outs that aren't for sale as companies (the JGE pattern), promoter and residency credit below institutional size (the iKon pattern), founder-run festivals pre-consolidation (the ASF pattern), and demand-gen-advantaged formats we see early through Fever.
The mechanism, named
Roll-up multiple arbitrage on fragmented promoter and festival EBITDA, amplified by IP-attach economics, funded ~80% by outside capital that Stage 1 proof points unlock. Operating leverage alone cannot do it: promoter margins run 3–7%.
The honest cap
If the Concentrate test fails — assets share a theme but no operating engine — this is a very good SPV franchise, not a platform. That finding goes to the room, not under the rug.
Category score
Strong category, contingent bridge. Fund Stage 1 fully. Make Stage 2 ambition explicitly conditional on proof points 1–3 and the quarterly entry-multiple monitor.
Act I · The room we're playing
Size the room before you book it
| Layer | Size | Evidence & caveat |
|---|---|---|
| Global live music | ~$38–55B ('25–'26) 6–9% CAGR | CMI: $38.58B (2025) growing 8.78% to $62.6B by 2034. Mordor: $54.5B (2026) to $72.4B by 2031. Estimates diverge ~40% on definition — ticketing and sponsorship inclusion. Working band: $40–50B. |
| Live Nation (consolidated-core proxy) | >$25B rev FY2025 | Revenue +9% YoY. Concerts $20.9B (83%, +10%), ticketing $3.1B (12%), sponsorship $1.3B (5%). 159M fans (+5%). AOI $2.4B. LN alone is more than half the global market — the defining structural fact of the category. |
| Broadway (US commercial theater proxy) | ~$1.9B / season | 2024–25: record $1.89B, 14.7M attendance. 2025–26: $1.91B, a record again — but attendance fell ~0.5% and price ($131 avg) did the work. Read: price-led records masking flat volume. Hit-driven market. |
| Residencies / immersive venues | Sphere = the datapoint | Sphere Ent. FY2025 revenue $1.22B (+8%). The Vegas venue grossed $379M on 1.7M tickets in 2025 — highest-grossing arena on earth per Pollstar. Wizard of Oz: 2.2M tickets, ~$290M, ~$132/ticket since Aug '25. |
| Comedy (fastest-growing sub-segment) | Top 10 ≈ $400M gross | Top 10 comedy acts grossed $396.7M in 2024, +52% YoY (Billboard). 2025 softened on all-in pricing and macro; executives forecast a strong 2026. Low production cost, high margin, extreme talent-dependency. |
| "Immersive entertainment" headline TAMs | Unusable | Mordor claims $147B (2026) but folds in theme parks, VR, escape rooms. The investable immersive-theater slice is likely low single-digit $B. A defensible bottoms-up number was not attainable in a week — flagged per house rules. We do not cite this as our market. |
SAM — what we can actually transact against
Estate live-IP carve-outs
Licensable rights value entering play. No market report exists; deal-by-deal. Estimate, ours.
Sub-radar festival M&A
Superstruct's own bolt-ons: 70% of Snowbombing for £3.95M, 70% of Cross The Tracks for £1.7M, 60% of a Barcelona EDM promoter for £3.48M. The platform sold to KKR at €1.3B — 10.8x €120M EBITDA.
Promoter / residency finance
iKon alone seeks $50M. Sphere production runs $5–12M/day with $7–10M A-list guarantees. Estimate from iKon + the EverWonder $60M vehicle.
That 2–5x-in, 10x-out spread is the single most important number in this presentation. Everything in Act III hangs off it.
Sources: Custom Market Insights 5/30/26 · Mordor Intelligence 2026 · Billboard 2/20/26 · Music Business Worldwide 2/19/26 · LN 10-K via StockTitan · Broadway League 5/25 · Playbill 5/27/26 · CRE Daily & Pollstar 7/26 · Accio/Billboard 5/26 · Pollstar exec survey 1/16/26 · MBW 3/5/25 · NKP M&A / Reuters 6/24. SAM figures are our estimates, labeled as such.
The players, by layer
Value chain top to bottom. Amber outline marks our positions and pipeline. Struck-through means excluded by standing verdict. Hover any name for the one-line read.
Explicit exclusions: pure venue propcos (opco/propco stay separate), generalist ticketing, agencies below Moment Factory scale, and the undifferentiated middle tier — regional 2,000-cap venues with no IP. The category's graveyard. Professional-networking column eliminated previously; not revisited.
Where the deals actually come from
Motion 1 · Fever's producer graph
Highest signal. Fever holds equity in top producers (Moment Factory went $27M to $150M through Fever) and sees demand data on every format before the market does. Motion: quarterly review of Fever's top-20 producer partners; approach the two or three with owned IP and no institutional capital.
Motion 2 · Estate referrals
Proprietary. JGE and Grace make us the known buyer for live rights nobody knows how to structure. Estates talk through the same five lawyers. Motion: map the ~10 estate attorneys and business managers behind Garcia/Dylan/Ali-class estates; standing offer architecture — license plus advisory plus capital option, never acquisition.
Motion 3 · Vegas residency network
Structurally underserved. Promoters needing show-level capital are too small for institutional credit and too risky for banks. Motion: iKon as the template term sheet; make the $3–10M credit-with-kicker facility known in the Sphere and Vegas production community.
Motion 4 · Festival succession sellers
Superstruct's leftovers. Founder-run 15–30K festivals facing burnout and cost inflation, ideologically anti-KKR — the 230+ artist open letter, Brian Eno among the signatures, is our cold-call script. Motion: ASF as the reference deal; work the ILMC and European festival-association circuit.
Manufacturing deals that aren't for sale
Carve-out
Estate live rights, JGE model: a 15–25 year license vehicle. The estate keeps the catalog. Nothing was for sale until we papered it.
Incubation
Ampersand: capital plus strategy at holdco level before there's a company to buy. Discipline applied: one sub-$50 anchor-ticket product before anything premium.
Operator recruitment
The Garnet Street analog. Don't buy venues or festivals — recruit the best residency and festival operators and back them into assets we structure. Find the best franchisee of live performance.
Reluctant sellers
Structured equity ladder: 10–20% plus milestones plus call options priced today. Superstruct proved sellers accept 60–70% with earnouts. We offer the friendlier minority version, with a path.
Why us. Specifically.
1 · Fever information asymmetry
Demand-side data plus a producer equity graph nobody else at our size sees. Built-in distribution exit for anything we incubate — the Bruce Lee hand-off proved the lane runs both ways.
2 · Estate-structuring record
JGE (15-year Garcia rights) plus Grace (first to align all four Beatles parties). Two-deal proof we can paper trust-based rights deals institutions can't. Primary Wave buys catalogs; we structure live rights. Different product, less competition.
3 · Credit-with-kicker template
The iKon term sheet plus E1's discipline — cash-flow component or real-estate backing on every deal. An underwriting playbook VCs don't have and banks won't touch.
4 · A cultural LP base
Our LPs — operators, next-gen family offices — are the counterparty estates and founders want. Anti-KKR festival sentiment plus anti-LN artist sentiment makes "not institutional PE" a priced advantage, not a vibe.
5 · Speed at sub-institutional size
$2–10M checks, 30-day papering, in a category where the majors' minimum deal size starts above our maximum.
What we do not have
Operating capability to run venues or festivals — we never pretend otherwise. Music-bank leverage relationships. Any edge in generalist touring.
Pipeline math that admits its own risk
Qualified / quarter
Fever graph 2–3 · estate referrals 1–2 · promoter finance 2–3 · festival succession 1–2 · comedy & immersive 2–3 · LP-network inbound 1–2. Consistent with actuals: eight live names accumulated over ~two quarters before expansion.
Conversion
Qualified to term sheet ~20% — taste bar, IP test and Fever screen kill more names as volume rises. Term sheet to close ~50%. Net: 1–1.5 closes per quarter.
18-month output
At $2.5–4M average. Matches $25M: the $18M slug takes 3–4 FCF deals, the $7M sleeve takes 2–3 IP and taste positions including one or two $250K checks.
Honesty check: estate deals run six-to-twelve-month cycles with binary family risk. See Esme Grace. The expanded universe's real gain is 2x coverage on every sleeve, so Stage 1 no longer depends on any single family or founder saying yes.
Act II · First set — months 0–18, the $25M
Where distributable cash actually lives
The test for the $18M slug: throws off cash an LP can receive within 18 months. Everything else is a different bucket or a different category.
| Sub-segment | Distributable? | Mechanism & evidence | Verdict for the $18M |
|---|---|---|---|
| Independent promoters (show-level) | Yes — best shape | iKon: 54 shows, $21.9M rev, ~$7M net (2025). Waterfall returns capital + preferred per project. Debt collateralized against pre-sales and guarantees (Mayweather $15M / Pacquiao $12M; the EverWonder/Netflix $60M vehicle validates at scale). | CORE. Credit + kicker. Self-liquidating. Best downside shape in the category. |
| Residency / production finance | Yes — per-project | Sphere production $5–12M/day; $7–10M A-list guarantees; minimum 10 dates. The venue side works ($379M gross 2025, top arena globally). The financeable gap is the production and promoter layer. | CORE. Same instrument. Underwrite the guarantee, not the artist. |
| Profitable festivals (P&L level) | Yes — annual | Superstruct bolt-on evidence: 60–70% founder-festival stakes at £1.7–4M, roughly 2–5x EBITDA implied. A 25–30K festival at €1–2M EBITDA distributes annually. | CORE at the right price. ASF template: advisory + fixed-price option beats buying today. |
| Venue opcos with IP | Conditional | Silencio: €7M rev, €2M EBITDA on 6,000 sq ft. Real FCF — but the €10M raise consumes it for expansion. You're buying growth, not distributions. | Only with a distribution covenant, or via SPV pricing the expansion risk. Unfocused-scope concern stands. |
| Commercial theater (Broadway / West End) | No | Record $1.91B season with attendance down ~0.5% and price doing the work. Rising costs, ever-shorter windows for shows to find footing. Hit-driven, binary per-show outcomes. | Excluded from the slug. Theater exposure lives in the $7M sleeve via Ampersand and Pasek IP only. |
| Comedy | No at talent level | Top-10 comedy grossed $396.7M in 2024, +52% — and talent captures nearly all of it. Fails the talent-dependency screen. Format and room IP is the only investable surface, and it's early. | Watch list, not Stage 1 capital. |
| Touring at scale | No for us | LN concerts run a 3.3% AOI margin on $20.9B. A scale-and-flow business we can't play. | Context only. |
The $18M is anchor capital,
not direct positions
Every dollar anchors a $10M+ SPV. Gating rule holds: no outside capital, no deal. One tension for the room, stated plainly: Fever fits neither bucket cleanly — mid-stage growth equity, not distributing FCF. Recommendation: it sits inside the $18M as the designated platform exception. That's a decision, not a footnote.
Instrument 1 — the product we manufacture
Credit line with equity kicker (iKon template). Per-project draw-down. Waterfall: investor whole + preferred, then split. Kicker: 5–15% warrant or equity. Self-liquidating in 12–24 months.
Instrument 2
Structured minority, 10–20%, with a papered annual distribution policy, a milestone ladder to 25–35% with calls priced today (ASF's fixed $8M is the model), information rights, negative controls.
Never
Control acquisitions — we can't operate. Venue propco. Unsecured show finance without guarantees or pre-sales collateral.
| Position | $ | Bucket | Structure | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fever SPV anchor | $3–5M | Mid-stage — flagged platform exception | Secondary at 10–15% discount; fees to ManCo | Closing Aug/Sep 2026 |
| iKon-type credit facility #1 | $4–5M → $10–15M SPV | Cash-flowing | Credit + kicker, per-project draws | Term sheet ready; structure is the diligence |
| Promoter / residency facility #2 (new name via Motion 3) | $3–4M anchor | Cash-flowing | Same template | Manufacture, months 6–12 |
| Festival positions (ASF option reserve + one succession seller) | $2–3M | Cash-flowing | ASF fixed-$8M option (24-mo) + one 15–25% structured minority | ASF live; second name from the ILMC circuit |
| Silencio (conditional) | $2–3M | Cash-flowing, if covenant + focus resolved | SPV with French family co-investors | Diligence. Kill if scope stays clubs + hotels + festivals |
| Unallocated reserve | $1–2M | — | Follow-on / broken-deal buffer | — |
Governance minimums, every deal: monthly financials with show-level P&L. Distribution policy in the docs, not in trust. Negative controls on M&A, related-party transactions, budget variance over 15%. Key-man and talent-dependency provisions — iKon's promoter relationships, Silencio's booking network post-Lynch. Board seat or observer on equity; covenant package on credit.
The $7M sleeve is already 70% spoken for
The job is closing and structuring, not sourcing. Every sleeve position passes the three-question IP test at underwriting, with Q3 — a third party pays to attach — as the explicit bull-case driver. That's what makes these asymmetric rather than merely illiquid.
IP SPV anchor · $2.5–3M
Into the $20M+ vehicle. JGE at 12.5% direct + transfer rights + second board seat — hold the line from the bridge-loan pass. Grace re-engagement after the film wraps mid-August. Positioning per house view: not a financial product. Story, access, perks papered. Bear 2–3x via cash flows; bull 6–10x. Don't call it a fund.
Ampersand incubation · $2–2.5M
Holdco level — wherever Agnes gets paid, that's where our money sits. Condition precedent: a prioritized slate. One sub-$50 anchor-ticket product first, not nine ideas. The engaged-bet minimum applies: below $2M we don't matter to her.
Taste checks · 2 × $250K
The Donald Glover filter. Candidates: the Benj Pasek vehicle; one comedy format where the room or show is the asset and talent doesn't need to be present, or undervalues its own IP. TYGER stays watch-only.
Reserve · ~$1M
For one Fever-graph surprise: a producer with owned IP and no institutional capital, surfaced by Motion 1.
Three proofs buy the next act
Proof 1 · month 12–15
Capital drawn, shows executed, waterfall pays. Documented net IRR of 15–20%+ with zero principal impairment. Proves promoter finance is a repeatable manufactured product — unlocks facilities #2 and #3 and a dedicated credit sleeve at Concentrate.
Proof 2 · by month 18
One third-party licensing or attachment deal — a brand, a venue, or a Fever-distributed format paying to attach to Garcia or Grace IP — or a first cash distribution. The single highest-leverage proof for the $500M story.
Proof 3 · rolling
Fever SPV + IP SPV closed at $30M+ combined third-party AUM with fee income at or above the category's fully loaded cost. Proves the origination flywheel: we're paid to build the platform.
Explicitly not a proof point: paper markups on the sleeve. Trajectory is not marks.
The category pays its own crew, or it doesn't tour
Cost, 18 months
Tom (lead) + ~0.3 FTE Anna + Aubrey oversight ≈ $250–350K internal allocation. External legal $350–500K: estate paper $75–150K each, credit docs $50–100K per facility, SPV formation $25–40K each. Diligence, travel, conferences $60–90K. Our estimates.
Offset, same window
Fever SPV fees: 2% on $10–20M ≈ $200–400K/yr, 3-year cap. IP SPV fees: 2% on $20M+ ≈ $400K/yr. Accretive only if origination succeeds — which is the correct incentive design.
Headcount trigger
One associate (~$150–200K/yr) only after Proof 1 or Proof 3 lands. If neither lands by month 15, the category earns a smaller Stage 2, not headcount.
Act III · Headliner — years 2–10, the $500M bridge
Five levers. One carries the show.
1 · Multiple arbitrage — the spine
Superstruct bought 60–70% festival stakes at £1.7–4M (roughly 2–5x implied) and the assembled platform sold to KKR at €1.3B — 10.8x €120M EBITDA. The spread exists because one festival is weather, hit and founder risk, while eighty diversified festivals are an institutional asset class. That diversification re-rate is purchasable at our scale.
2 · Central sponsorship — the margin lever
LN's sponsorship division runs a 64% AOI margin: $845M AOI on $1.3B revenue. Aggregated audiences convert to brand revenue no independent can reach alone. Platform-level sponsorship across 10–15 assets adds an estimated 300–600bps of blended margin without touching operations. Estimate ours.
3 · IP-attach compounding — the multiple enhancer
Estate and format IP layered onto owned distribution converts operating EBITDA into licensing-mix EBITDA. Worth one to two turns at exit — not a standalone bridge. The IP SPV alone would need 15–20x. Not creditable.
4 · Platform fees on other people's capital
Anchor 20%, raise 80%, 2-and-20. The ManCo compounds alongside the platform. GP economics are Saltwater's kicker and do not count toward platform TEV — flagged so the arithmetic stays honest.
5 · Fever distribution — priced at zero
Anything incubated scales through Fever (Moment Factory: $27M to $150M). Gate-passing ecosystem fit. Thesis is not synergy: upside, never underwriting.
How much debt the music can carry
Show-level credit
Self-liquidating against pre-sales and guarantees. That's turnover, not balance-sheet leverage. Our core instrument lives here.
Platform debt · 2.0–2.5x max
Festival and promoter cash flows are seasonal and weather-exposed. Underwrite 2.0–2.5x EBITDA at the Holdco, and only after eight-plus assets diversify the seasonality. Anything more aggressive re-creates Cirque 2020: marquee brand, fragile fixed costs, bankruptcy.
Fragmentation check
Superstruct owns 80+ festivals and still ranks second to LN, with hundreds of independents left across Europe and Australia. The US independent layer and LatAm are essentially unconsolidated at our check size. Supply is not the constraint. Seller willingness and our diligence bandwidth are.
The bridge
Six steps, every assumption on the table. Switch the scenario — the numbers, the bars and the verdict recompute. The table closes at base. It does not close without outside capital, and we say so.
Sensitivity detail: Bear = $35M EBITDA, no organic outperformance, 7x exit → $245M. Still a fine Saltwater outcome (GP economics + ~2.5–3x on principal) but it misses the brief's bar; probability-weight it meaningfully. Base requires the Holdco raise to land at $85M or better. Bull = IP-mix re-rate to 12x on $55M. House-only = $25M compounding at 20% net for 8.5 years ≈ $118M: without the Holdco raise this category cannot reach $500M. Outside capital is not optional. It is the mechanism.
Three ways the rig comes down
1 · Systemic demand shock
The Cirque-2020 pattern. Fixed-cost live businesses die fast in shutdowns — Cirque went bankrupt with the strongest brand in the category. Partially mitigable: credit-first structuring, the 2.0–2.5x leverage cap, mandated event-cancellation insurance. A 2020-scale event still marks the equity sleeve near zero for ~18 months.
2 · Entry-multiple compression
The thesis-killer. CVC, LN and copycat family offices bid bolt-ons from 3–5x toward 6–8x and the spine thins. Partially mitigable: stay below institutional minimum check sizes; weaponize anti-PE seller preference; source earlier via succession. Kill-switch Monitored quarterly: blended entry above ~6x for two consecutive quarters → cut Stage 2 ambition to the $250M honest cap and say so.
3 · Key-man concentration
Promoter books and festival identities are founder relationships — iKon's booker, ASF's founders, Silencio's Lynch-derived network, already stress-tested by Lynch's passing. Mostly mitigable: three-to-five-year earnouts keeping founders economically present, key-man covenants, platform booking redundancy after asset five.
Standing constraint, not a failure mode — Fever conflict discipline. The platform never competes with Fever's ticketing and demand-gen layer, or Ryan's position becomes a liability. Every Stage 2 asset carries the conflict tag at IC.
Encore · The lineup
42 names on the bill
Every act tagged: capital bucket, value-chain layer, the three-question IP test, Agnes Chu scale tier, Four C's lead with talent-dependency, and the relationship to our Fever / JGE / ASF / Grace / Ampersand / iKon / Silencio / E1 positions. IP lamps read Q1 exclude · Q2 reuse · Q3 attach — lit green passes, amber partial, red fails, hollow not applicable. Tap a row for the full read.
Education: who teaches us this business
Ten people, in priority order
1 · James Barton, Superstruct founder — ran our exact playbook; one dinner is a quarter of diligence. 2 · Andrew McGuinness, Layered Reality CEO — the only operator who has papered an ABG estate-rights deal at our scale. 3 · Peter Shapiro, Brooklyn Bowl/Relix — de-risks JGE; knows Garcia-audience economics better than anyone alive. 4 · A Pophouse investment-team member — the €1.2B fund defines our thesis ceiling. 5 · Seth Hurwitz, I.M.P. — independent-promoter economics, and a Tier-2 target himself. 6 · Our Fever counterpart — formalize the quarterly producer-graph review. 7 · Ian Orefice, EverWonder — residency-finance underwriting standards. 8 · Danny Wimmer — US festival M&A temperature, and Tier-2. 9 · A Sonia Friedman-class West End lead producer — theater hit-risk calibration. 10 · A Superstruct/CVC deal-team member — where entry multiples are actually printing. Failure-mode-2 monitor.
Conferences & communities
ILMC London (Feb–Mar) — the independent-promoter room. Pollstar Live LA (Feb). IEBA Nashville (Oct) — routing and booking economics. Aspen Live (Dec) — senior-only, high taste bar. Skip SXSW-class generalist events: the seminar/B2B exclusion applies.
Advisors to retain
1 · Entertainment-finance counsel with estate-rights depth — JGE/Grace-class paper. 2 · An ex-LN/AEG touring CFO as fractional underwriting advisor on promoter credit, success-fee'd. 3 · An event-cancellation insurance broker relationship, established before facility #1 draws.
Curtain
Scorecard, then the asks
Weighted read: ~3.9. Strong category, contingent bridge. Fund Stage 1 fully; make Stage 2 conditional on the proofs and the multiple monitor.
Rule on the Fever bucket. Platform exception inside the $18M, or carve a third bucket. Decide it tonight so the allocation stands.
Greenlight the iKon term sheet. $4–5M anchor toward a $10–15M facility SPV. Structure is the diligence.
Hold the line on JGE. 12.5% direct + transfer rights + second board seat. No bridge loans. The July pass stands.
Small print
Every claim sourced. Live Nation FY2025 — Billboard 2/20/26, Music Business Worldwide 2/19/26, LN 10-K summary via StockTitan, LN Newsroom. Broadway — Broadway League end-of-season releases 5/25, Playbill 5/28/25 and 5/27/26. Sphere — MBW 2/19/26 and 5/7/26, Sphere Q4/FY2025 release, CRE Daily/Pollstar 7/26, Las Vegas Live 2/13/26. Superstruct — NKP M&A Insights (€1.3B, ~10.8x, 6/24), MBW UK-entity accounts incl. bolt-on prices 3/5/25, Preqin (CVC, 10/24), Access AA open-letter coverage 5/25. Live-music TAM — Custom Market Insights 5/30/26, Mordor 2026; divergence flagged in-text.
Comedy — Billboard year-end via Accio, Pollstar 2026 Comedy Executive Survey 1/16/26, AEG–Outback releases 5/1/26, Billboard on the Since Entertainment spin-off 5/4/26. Just For Laughs — THR bankruptcy and asset-sale coverage 3/24–6/24 (creditors $26.5M), THR/Variety relaunch coverage 2024–25. Pophouse — MBW fund close 3/31/25, MBW/Music Week KISS deal 4/4/24, TechTimes Iron Maiden partnership 7/15/26. Layered Reality — Channel 4 PR 8/24, Crowdcube 11/24, WXO 9/25, AInvest 7/25, Prospeo estimate. Lightroom — 59.studio, lightroom.uk. DWP — Spectrum/LEO/Blabbermouth 4/25, Yahoo and MetalInsider 2025 records. UNTOLD — Romania Insider 6–7/26 and 2/23. Insomniac — Billboard/Pollstar/Forbes. MARI/TodayTix — Variety 11/3/25, Great Hill 10/20/25; Secret Cinema — THR/Variety 9/22. Internal — Saltwater Context Document, July 2026.
Open diligence flags — asserted with explicit uncertainty.
- Another Planet founder-succession angle: our inference, not reported.
- Zamna, Afro Nation, Don't Tell Comedy, Sofar Sounds: financials from general knowledge only; verify before outreach.
- Sleep No More NYC closure; Superblue and Illuminarium restructurings: general knowledge; cite-check before quoting in the room.
- Estate candidates — Miles Davis, Nina Simone, Fela Kuti, Marley: rights status, family dynamics and encumbrances (incl. possible Primary Wave positions) unconfirmed. A sourcing list, not a pipeline claim.
- Theatrical licensing catalog ownership details: verify.
- SAM figures and the sponsorship-margin uplift (300–600bps): our estimates, labeled as such throughout.
- ComediHa!/JFL: the no-turnarounds house rule gets argued at IC before any term sheet.
- Immersive headline TAMs: excluded as unusable. A defensible bottoms-up number was not attainable in one week.
House rules honored: lead with the answer · cash-flowing vs mid-stage vs venture-taste separated · value-chain position tagged and the three-question IP test run on every name · talent-dependency and middle-market positioning flagged · no agencies below Moment Factory scale · nothing below $10M SPV viability except $250K taste checks · every opportunity framed against Fever · when in doubt, if it's this hard to say yes, the answer is no.
Production notes. Lighting effects are decorative and can be switched off with the FX control, top right. Brief light-flicker moments are disabled automatically when the system asks for reduced motion. Confidential: Saltwater investment team only. Named targets stay in this room. Independent work product — not coordinated with the other three category readouts. Written and argued by the category lead; typos are his too.